Week 44: One CA private key was the number 4. Check what your machines still trust
Eight eMudhra CA keys were trivially weak. Browsers blocked them, but curl, Python, Node and Java may not have. How to check them and your own domains.
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October 21 to 27. Most certificate authority disasters involve a stolen key. This one didn’t need a thief. Eight of eMudhra’s intermediate CA private keys were so weak that anyone could compute them from the public certificates, and one of them was literally the number 4.
What happened
On October 17 a researcher who goes by Wayne reported to the browser root programs that the private keys for eight eMudhra intermediate CAs could be recovered by anyone (Internet Freedom Foundation). Mozilla’s analysis found each key was a whole number smaller than 256. Scott Helme recovered all eight in under a second and published the values: 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230 and 237 (Scott Helme, Safeguard).
Six of the eight could issue TLS certificates and two were for code signing (Implicator). Anyone holding them could mint a certificate for any website, and browsers would have trusted it. eMudhra revoked all eight on October 18. Mozilla and Google confirmed the compromise on October 20, and Chrome, Firefox and Apple blocked them (BleepingComputer, The Hacker News). On October 22, eMudhra said it is leaving the global SSL/TLS certificate business. Even mitmproxy added an --emudhra option, which tells you how real this is.
Your browser is fine. It updated itself. The question is everything that isn’t a browser.
Why “revoked” isn’t enough
Browsers have their own blocklists and pushed updates within days. Most other TLS clients, like curl, Python, Node and Java, trust whatever is in their certificate bundle, and many don’t check revocation at all. So a revoked intermediate can keep working for them as long as its root is still in the bundle.
These intermediates chain up to eMudhra’s emSign roots and, through a 2025 cross-sign, to Sectigo’s old AAA Certificate Services root (Safeguard). Vendors are handling that differently. Homebrew’s ca-certificates, for one, now excludes emSign ECC Root CA - G3, emSign Root TLS CA - G3 and AAA Certificate Services (The Hacker News). Go shipped 1.27.3 and 1.26.10, which reject any chain containing one of the eight keys (CVE-2026-111943), but you have to rebuild your binaries to get it.
The safe move is to update your trust bundles from your vendor rather than hand-deleting roots. Pulling AAA Certificate Services yourself can break a lot of legitimate sites. Here’s how to see where you stand.
Walkthrough: find what still trusts the chain
1. Linux system store. Debian and Ubuntu name the files after the CA. Fedora, RHEL and Arch can use trust:
ls /etc/ssl/certs | grep -i emsign
trust list 2>/dev/null | grep -i -A2 emsign
Then update the bundle and see what changed:
sudo apt update && sudo apt install --only-upgrade ca-certificates # Debian, Ubuntu
sudo dnf upgrade ca-certificates # Fedora, RHEL
2. macOS.
security find-certificate -a -c emSign /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep '"labl"'
3. Python. requests and many other libraries use certifi, not the system store. Each virtualenv has its own copy:
grep -n "emSign" "$(python3 -m certifi)"
python3 -m pip install --upgrade certifi
4. Node. Node ships its own root list inside the binary, so only a Node update changes it:
node -e "const {X509Certificate}=require('crypto');console.log(require('tls').rootCertificates.map(p=>new X509Certificate(p).subject).filter(s=>/emSign|eMudhra/i.test(s)))"
5. Java.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i emsign
(changeit is the default, publicly documented store password. If yours is different, someone changed it on purpose.)
6. Go. Check your toolchain, then rebuild and redeploy anything that makes outbound TLS connections:
go version
You want 1.27.3 or newer on 1.27, or 1.26.10 or newer on 1.26.
7. Containers. Every image has its own ca-certificates package from the day it was built. Rebuild from an updated base image. An old image that never gets rebuilt never gets the fix.
Walkthrough: check your own domains
8. Who issued your certificate?
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer
If the issuer mentions emSign or eMudhra, eMudhra estimates about 30,000 certificates need moving to another CA (Implicator). Start now.
9. Did anyone mint a certificate for your domain? Every publicly trusted certificate is logged in Certificate Transparency, so you can look:
curl -s "https://crt.sh/?q=example.com&output=json" | jq -r '.[].issuer_name' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn
An issuer you’ve never used, especially one from this chain, is worth chasing. One more lesson here: a CAA record only stops honest CAs from issuing for your domain. Somebody holding a CA’s private key just signs the certificate themselves. Certificate Transparency monitoring is how you’d find out.
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